The Houthis’ escalating attacks have exposed the limits of Saudi Arabia’s military strength and raised troubling questions about security across the Middle East. The repercussions extend far beyond the region. Airports, energy facilities, commercial shipping and other critical infrastructure face growing risks, while airlines and businesses struggle with disruptions, cancellations and rising operating costs. For Bangladesh, the consequences are not merely geopolitical: they are already reflected in higher shipping expenses and growing uncertainty over energy supplies and international trade.
The central question is difficult to ignore: if a regional military power backed by advanced weapons and international partners cannot neutralise the Houthi threat, how realistic are broader promises of lasting security in the Middle East?
The history of regional conflicts demonstrates that resistance by a comparatively weaker force against a militarily superior adversary is hardly new. Yet the Houthi movement in Yemen has demonstrated how asymmetric warfare can challenge conventional military calculations. Despite Saudi Arabia’s substantial defence expenditure, sophisticated aircraft and air-defence systems, the Houthis have remained a formidable adversary. Their continued ability to threaten strategic infrastructure and maritime routes has complicated the calculations of regional powers.From a local movement to a regional security challenge
The Houthis, formally known as Ansar Allah, emerged from a Zaydi Shia religious and social movement in northern Yemen. Over time, they evolved into a powerful political and military organisation. Their seizure of Sanaa, Yemen’s capital, in 2014 fundamentally altered the country’s balance of power. In 2015, Saudi Arabia led a military intervention in support of Yemen’s internationally recognised government, seeking to reverse the Houthi advance.
Years of airstrikes, ground fighting and economic disruption failed to eliminate the movement. Instead, the conflict became entrenched, creating conditions in which the Houthis could consolidate control over substantial territory and develop capabilities that threaten targets far beyond their original strongholds.Bab el-Mandeb: A local conflict with global consequences
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is central to this wider picture. Connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden, it forms part of the maritime corridor linking Asian markets with Europe through the Suez Canal. Threats to shipping can force vessels to take the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope, increasing voyage times, fuel consumption, insurance premiums and freight charges.
The economic effects are well documented. In its analysis of the Red Sea crisis, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported that rerouting vessels around Africa added approximately 12 days to an Asia–Europe voyage. The disruption also reduced effective container-shipping capacity and drove up freight rates on major trade routes.
The International Monetary Fund’s analysis of Red Sea shipping disruptions similarly warned that longer delivery times and diversions could strain supply chains and put upward pressure on prices. The consequences are particularly serious for economies that depend heavily on imported fuel, food, fertiliser, chemicals, machinery and industrial inputs.Disruption to energy shipments can increase delivery costs and market uncertainty. Attacks on airports can cause casualties, flight cancellations, temporary closures, flight diversions and higher insurance costs. Sustained disruption at a major hub such as Riyadh can also affect international passenger connections, tourism and business travel. If retaliatory strikes spread beyond Yemen and Saudi Arabia, the resulting military expenditure and security risks could increase further.
Bangladesh is already paying the price
For Bangladesh, these are not abstract risks. A report published by The Daily Star on 14 September 2026 described how Bangladesh Shipping Corporation’s crude-oil tanker, MT Ninemia, carrying approximately 100,000 tonnes of oil from Saudi Arabia, took a longer route around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
The voyage took about 50 days, compared with an estimated 13–15 days on the usual route, and incurred an additional cost of Tk 66.63 crore. This single voyage illustrates how insecurity in a distant maritime corridor can translate into substantial costs for Bangladesh.If similar diversions become routine, the landed cost of imported crude oil could rise significantly. Higher energy costs could, in turn, affect electricity generation, transport, industrial production and consumer prices. Delays in the arrival of fuel cargoes could also complicate inventory management and supply planning.
Bangladesh’s export sector faces related pressures. The country’s garment industry and other exporters depend on reliable shipping schedules to meet delivery deadlines in Europe and elsewhere. Longer voyages can tie up working capital, complicate production planning and increase uncertainty for buyers and suppliers.
In a report published on 2 August 2026, The Daily Star documented rising freight costs amid the Middle East conflict, noting that container shipping rates to Europe had more than doubled. The report also highlighted an important qualification: many garment exporters operate under free-on-board (FOB) contract terms, meaning that the direct burden of ocean freight increases may fall on buyers rather than Bangladeshi exporters. Nevertheless, the wider effects of delays, uncertainty and higher costs throughout supply chains can still affect the sector.
