Special Correspondent:
Pakistan’s democratic experiment suffered a major setback on October 7, 1958, when President Iskander Mirza abrogated the Constitution, dissolved the legislatures and imposed martial law. Political parties were banned, and politicians across East and West Pakistan were arrested. The move effectively halted the country’s fragile democratic transition and paved the way for a prolonged period of military dominance.
But Mirza’s attempt to consolidate power through the military ultimately cost him his own presidency. Army chief General Mohammad Ayub Khan, whom Mirza appointed chief martial law administrator, soon turned against him and seized complete control of the state. The episode marked a defining moment in Pakistan’s political history, establishing a pattern of military intervention that would repeatedly undermine constitutional government.
Pakistan had been established in 1947, but its political institutions struggled to develop amid power struggles between civilian leaders, the bureaucracy and the military. The adoption of the 1956 Constitution offered hope for a parliamentary system modeled on the British Westminster tradition.
The Constitution established a parliamentary framework, and Mirza became Pakistan’s first president under the new system after serving as governor-general. Political leaders, including Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy and Chaudhry Mohammad Ali, had played important roles in the country’s constitutional development.
By early 1959, Pakistan was expected to hold its first general election under the new constitutional arrangement. The election could have provided an opportunity to establish representative government and strengthen democratic institutions.
Instead, Mirza and Ayub moved to prevent the transfer of political power to elected representatives. Mirza’s decision to abrogate the Constitution on October 7, 1958, dismantled the existing parliamentary framework and brought political activity to a standstill.
Ayub had reportedly harboured ambitions of taking control of the state since 1954, according to his later memoirs. At the time, he was not only army chief but also defence minister. Both Ayub and Mirza regarded the civilian political leadership with considerable disdain.
Following the declaration of martial law, Mirza appointed Ayub chief martial law administrator. He also formed a new cabinet that included Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a young, foreign-educated lawyer from Larkana who was a friend of Mirza’s son, Humayun Mirza.
Bhutto was reportedly so enthusiastic about his appointment that he wrote to the president expressing his gratitude. In the letter, he suggested that history might remember Mirza as an even greater figure than Pakistan’s founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah.
The political alliance between Mirza and Ayub, however, quickly deteriorated. Over the next 20 days, tensions grew as Ayub moved to establish his own authority. Senior military officers increasingly viewed the coexistence of two competing centres of power as untenable.
On October 27, 1958, military officers arrived at the presidential residence in Karachi and forced Mirza to resign at gunpoint. Among those involved was General Yahya Khan, who would later become Pakistan’s next military ruler.
Mirza was sent to Quetta by plane with his second wife, Nahid Mirza, before the couple were eventually exiled to London. He spent the remainder of his life abroad and was never permitted to return to Pakistan.
Ayub assumed the offices of president and chief martial law administrator, consolidating power in his own hands. His new cabinet included military officers alongside a number of civilians. Bhutto, meanwhile, quickly shifted his allegiance to the new ruler.
Pakistan’s judiciary played a significant role in legitimising the military takeover. Under Chief Justice Muhammad Munir, the courts relied on the controversial doctrine of necessity to provide legal justification for the new regime.
The doctrine had previously figured in the 1954 constitutional crisis, when Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad dissolved the Constituent Assembly. Speaker Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan challenged the dissolution, but the court rejected his challenge under Munir’s leadership.
Four years later, the judiciary again adopted a similar approach to the military seizure of power. Munir compared Ayub’s takeover with the French and Russian revolutions, although the historical circumstances and political character of those events differed substantially from Pakistan’s military intervention.
The court’s position established a controversial precedent that would later be invoked in debates over military rule and constitutional legitimacy in Pakistan. Rather than safeguarding democratic continuity, judicial acceptance of extra-constitutional power helped strengthen the military’s position in the state.
After taking power, Ayub set about reshaping Pakistan’s political system to consolidate his rule. In 1959, his government introduced the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order, widely known as EBDO, which was used to disqualify numerous politicians from electoral politics.
The measure weakened civilian political leadership and restricted political participation. During the first four years of Ayub’s rule, Pakistan remained under direct martial law.
Ayub also elevated himself to the rank of field marshal, despite not having achieved the rank through distinguished battlefield service.
In 1962, a new Constitution was introduced and martial law was lifted. However, the new political arrangement did not restore full parliamentary democracy. Instead, it institutionalised Ayub’s authority through a presidential system.
The electoral framework was based on an indirect system involving approximately 80,000 members known as Basic Democrats. They formed the electoral college responsible for choosing the president and participating in the election of other representatives.
Although a National Assembly and provincial assemblies for East and West Pakistan were established, their powers remained limited. The president retained substantial authority, including control over the appointment and removal of provincial governors.
The arrangement concentrated political power at the centre and left provincial administrations heavily dependent on the president’s preferences.
Ayub also sought a civilian political base by reorganising the Muslim League and creating the Convention Muslim League, which became the principal political vehicle for his administration.
Over the course of his decade in power, a civil-military structure emerged that weakened political parties and democratic institutions. Administrative officials and sections of the media helped cultivate a personality-centred image of the ruler. His memoir, Friends Not Masters, also became part of the political narrative surrounding his leadership.
Bhutto’s political rise accelerated under Ayub. Following the death of Mohammad Ali Bogra in 1963, Bhutto became foreign minister and emerged as one of the administration’s most influential figures.
In 1965, Pakistan went to war with India under Ayub’s leadership, with Bhutto playing a prominent role in the country’s foreign policy. The conflict ended without a decisive military victory for either side and placed considerable pressure on both countries.
In January 1966, Ayub and Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri signed the Tashkent Declaration, seeking to normalise relations after the war.
The agreement, however, triggered political controversy in Pakistan. Bhutto claimed that it contained a secret clause, fuelling public suspicion about the terms of the settlement. He subsequently left the government and began campaigning against Ayub, the very leader whose patronage had helped propel him to national prominence.
Bhutto’s shift illustrated the central role of political ambition and personal alliances in Pakistan’s power struggles. His transition from a member of Ayub’s cabinet to a leading opponent of the president helped shape the opposition movement that followed.
While Ayub promoted his government’s economic achievements under the slogan of a “Decade of Development,” dissatisfaction was growing in both wings of the country.
In East Pakistan, grievances over economic disparities, political exclusion, linguistic identity and the concentration of power in West Pakistan strengthened Bengali nationalism. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman emerged as the leading political voice of the province’s demand for greater autonomy.
In an attempt to undermine Mujib and suppress the nationalist movement, Ayub’s government brought the Agartala Conspiracy Case against him and other Bengali figures. The case accused them of conspiring to separate East Pakistan with assistance from India.
Rather than eliminating Mujib’s political influence, the case triggered widespread protests. Public support for him grew, and the movement for autonomy gained momentum.
The government’s attempt to marginalise Mujib thus backfired, helping transform him into a central figure in the struggle for Bengali political rights.
By early 1969, Ayub was facing a mounting political crisis. Sustained protests and opposition pressure forced his government to withdraw the Agartala Conspiracy Case. Mujib was invited to participate in a round-table conference in Rawalpindi.
Other opposition leaders, including Khan Abdul Wali Khan and Bhutto, had also faced arrest, but mounting public pressure led to their release.
The developments exposed the growing limitations of a political system built on military authority and administrative control. Despite Ayub’s efforts to portray himself as a modernising leader comparable to France’s Charles de Gaulle, his government was increasingly challenged by demands for democratic rights, political accountability and provincial autonomy.
In March 1969, Ayub relinquished power. Yet he did not restore constitutional continuity through the succession mechanism envisaged under the 1962 Constitution, which would have transferred presidential responsibilities to National Assembly Speaker Abdul Jabbar Khan.
Instead, Ayub handed power to army chief General Yahya Khan, who imposed martial law once again.
The transition demonstrated that the problem extended beyond individual rulers. Military intervention had become embedded in Pakistan’s political system, while democratic institutions remained too weak to ensure a constitutional transfer of power.
Mirza died in London in November 1969. Despite his wish to return to Pakistan, Yahya’s government did not permit his burial in the country, and his family buried him in Tehran.
Ayub died in April 1974, largely removed from the political prominence he had once enjoyed. His decade in power had transformed Pakistan’s institutions, but it had failed to establish a durable democratic order.
The 1958 takeover set a precedent for subsequent periods of military rule under Yahya Khan, General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf. Each intervention deepened questions about the balance between civilian authority, military power and constitutional government.
The pattern remains relevant to Pakistan’s contemporary politics. In a recent development, General Asim Munir was elevated to the rank of field marshal amid continuing debate over the military’s influence in national affairs.
The historical parallel underscores a recurring question: can a state achieve lasting political stability by concentrating power in the hands of the military and weakening democratic institutions?
Pakistan’s experience since October 1958 suggests that military intervention may consolidate authority in the short term, but it comes at a substantial cost to constitutional governance, political participation and public accountability.
The removal of Mirza and the rise of Ayub were not simply episodes of rivalry between two powerful men. They marked the beginning of a political pattern in which the military repeatedly displaced civilian institutions, leaving Pakistan’s democratic development vulnerable to prolonged disruption.
