Special Correspondent:

A political party’s present identity may shape the course of its future politics, but it cannot erase its past.

Parties evolve. Leaders change. Political strategies shift, and organisations can move away from positions they once held. But history cannot be rewritten simply because a political party has adopted a new identity.

In Bangladesh, this is precisely why the question of Jamaat-e-Islami’s role and position during the 1971 Liberation War remains relevant. It is not merely a dispute over the past; it is also a question of the party’s present political identity and credibility.

At a rally in Kushtia on August 16, Jamaat-e-Islami lawmaker Mufti Amir Hamza was reported to have described the terms “Razakar” and “Al-Badr” as an “Indian drama.” If the reported remarks are accurate, they do little to address the complex historical questions surrounding those organisations. Instead, such a statement risks reducing a deeply documented chapter of Bangladesh’s history to an India-versus-Bangladesh political narrative.

The history of 1971 does not rest on the account of any single country, government, media organisation or political party. Wartime documents, testimonies, Pakistani and international sources, academic research, historical works and judicial records have all contributed to the body of evidence surrounding the Liberation War.

Any attempt to challenge that history, therefore, must engage with the full range of available evidence rather than dismissing the subject as a foreign conspiracy.

What Do the Judicial Records Say?

The proceedings of Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal constitute an important body of judicial records concerning the 1971 conflict.

In the case involving Jamaat leader Muhammad Kamaruzzaman, the Supreme Court examined evidence concerning Al-Badr and its relationship with Jamaat-e-Islami and its student organisation, Islami Chhatra Sangha. The judgment also examined the relationship between Jamaat leaders and Pakistani military authorities and the formation and activities of Al-Badr and Al-Shams.

The judgment in the case of Ghulam Azam likewise examined extensive evidence concerning Jamaat’s political position during the Liberation War, as well as the activities of the Peace Committees, Razakars, Al-Badr and Al-Shams.

The tribunal process itself has been subject to political and legal debate. Critics have questioned various aspects of the trials, and those debates are legitimate in a democratic society.

But disagreement over a judicial process does not automatically turn the historical material presented and examined during those proceedings into an “Indian drama.”

The central questions therefore remain: If the history of Razakar and Al-Badr was fabricated by India, which specific elements of that history were fabricated? Did India invent Jamaat’s political position in 1971? Did it create the party’s opposition to the break-up of Pakistan? Did it manufacture the historical record concerning Islami Chhatra Sangha, political contacts with Pakistani military authorities, or the existence and activities of Al-Badr and Al-Shams?

These questions cannot be answered through political slogans alone. They require evidence.

The Burden of Historical Proof

Historical claims are not established merely by repetition, nor are they erased by political denial.

Various historical references, including Banglapedia, describe Al-Badr as a paramilitary force formed during the 1971 Liberation War with the backing of the Pakistani authorities. The organisation, along with Razakar and Al-Shams forces, has been discussed in accounts of efforts to suppress the independence movement.

The issue, therefore, is not the product of a recent political campaign. It is rooted in historical records that have existed for decades.

The same applies to the killing of Bengali intellectuals in December 1971.

The massacre remains one of the most painful chapters in Bangladesh’s national history. Its legacy is deeply connected to the families who lost relatives, the educational institutions that lost scholars and teachers, and a nation that experienced the final days of a devastating war.

The role of the Pakistani military and its local collaborators in the killings has been examined extensively in historical research and judicial proceedings.

That makes recent claims about the episode particularly significant.

In December 2025, a senior Jamaat leader reportedly claimed that the intellectual killings were part of a conspiracy planned by Indian military and intelligence agencies. The argument was that Pakistani troops, Razakar members and Al-Badr personnel were preparing to surrender or flee at the time and therefore could not have carried out the killings.

Such a claim can certainly be made in a democratic political environment. But a claim that overturns a long-established historical interpretation requires substantial evidence.

If new documents, eyewitness accounts or credible research support such an interpretation, those materials should be made public and examined seriously. A political assertion by itself, however, cannot establish a radically different historical account.

An Unresolved Contradiction

This is where an important contradiction in Jamaat’s contemporary politics emerges.

In May 2025, following the Supreme Court’s acquittal of Jamaat leader ATM Azharul Islam in a crimes-against-humanity case, Jamaat’s top leadership reportedly apologised unconditionally to people who had suffered as a result of the party or its members’ actions.

Later, in October, a senior party leader apologised for any suffering caused by Jamaat since 1947 and acknowledged that Jamaat had opposed the break-up of Pakistan in 1971. He also said that the aspirations of the people of what is now Bangladesh should have been respected at the time.

Such statements are politically significant.

A political organisation acknowledging past mistakes can be an important sign of change. But a general apology and detailed historical accountability are not necessarily the same thing.

A credible reckoning with the past requires clearer answers: What decisions were wrong? Why were they wrong? What was the organisation’s position at the time? What has changed since then? And how can the public be assured that the political principles behind those earlier positions have genuinely been abandoned?

This becomes particularly important when members of the same political organisation appear to offer contradictory interpretations of 1971—apologising for the past on one hand while describing major elements of the established historical narrative as an “Indian drama” on the other.

That naturally raises a difficult question: Has Jamaat genuinely confronted its past, or has it merely changed the language with which it discusses that past?

The Azharul Islam Case Is a Separate Question

The acquittal of ATM Azharul Islam by the Supreme Court in May 2025 must, of course, be respected as a judicial decision.

An individual acquitted in a particular criminal case cannot be treated as having been legally proven guilty of those charges.

But an individual’s acquittal in a specific case and Jamaat-e-Islami’s broader political position during 1971 are two different questions.

One judicial verdict cannot, by itself, answer every question surrounding the political history of an organisation.

Jamaat can legitimately argue that the organisation of today is not the organisation of 1971. Such an argument can be politically credible if it is accompanied by visible evidence of fundamental change.

Political organisations can evolve across generations. They can abandon previous positions, adopt new policies and acknowledge the mistakes of their predecessors.

But genuine political transformation requires more than new slogans.

It requires an honest reckoning with the past.

What Would Genuine Change Look Like?

If Jamaat has truly moved away from the political position it held in 1971, it could make that position clearer.

It could explicitly acknowledge historically established facts concerning the Liberation War. It could recognise the suffering of victims and their families. It could acknowledge that supporting the preservation of Pakistan in 1971 was a political position that was wrong. And it could make clear that such a position has no place in its politics today.

Such clarity would make the party’s political transformation more credible.

Without it, the combination of apologies for the past and attempts to challenge established historical accounts will continue to raise questions about whether the party is undergoing genuine ideological change or simply engaging in political rebranding.

What About the Younger Generation?

Another argument sometimes heard in political debates is that young Bangladeshis are no longer interested in the Liberation War.

That assumption deserves scrutiny.

Young people may not discuss 1971 in exactly the same way as previous generations. They may question the political use of the Liberation War. They may reject attempts by any particular political party to claim exclusive ownership of its legacy.

But questioning the political interpretation of history does not mean forgetting history.

In fact, the intensity of contemporary political debate over 1971 demonstrates that the Liberation War remains deeply connected to Bangladesh’s national identity and political consciousness.

Young Bangladeshis have every right to question historical narratives. But those questions should be answered with evidence and research—not by declaring history irrelevant.

The Liberation War Belongs to the People

The Liberation War is not the property of any political party.

Neither the Awami League, BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami nor any other political organisation can claim exclusive ownership of the memory and legacy of 1971.

The war belongs to those who fought. It belongs to those who died. It belongs to families who lost loved ones, to people who were forced to flee their homes, and to generations that inherited the consequences of the conflict.

That is why attempts to explain uncomfortable parts of history as foreign conspiracies are unlikely to provide a credible long-term political strategy.

Bangladeshis have the right to question history. They have the right to examine documents, challenge interpretations and express dissent.

But they also have the right to question attempts to deny historically documented events without presenting convincing evidence.

Jamaat has the right to participate in democratic politics. Its supporters have the right to defend the party, and the party has the right to respond to criticism.

But democratic politics does not give any political organisation ownership over history.

No party can decide which parts of the national past people should remember and which they should forget.

Two Possible Paths

Jamaat can change its candidates, leadership, campaign language and political messaging. It can seek to present itself to a new generation in a new way. It can apologise for past mistakes.

But none of those actions changes the historical record of 1971.

The party therefore faces two broad choices.

One is to deny uncomfortable aspects of its history, shift responsibility for major events onto others and treat historical questions as conspiracy theories.

The other is to confront its political past, acknowledge mistakes, accept historically established evidence and demonstrate that the Jamaat of today is fundamentally different from the political organisation that opposed Bangladesh’s independence in 1971.

The second path is undoubtedly more difficult.

But it is also more credible.

A political party cannot erase its past. It can only learn from it.

For Jamaat-e-Islami, the real test of political transformation will therefore not be the slogans it adopts or the image it presents to a new generation. It will be whether it can confront the historical record of 1971 honestly and consistently.

The history of the Liberation War does not need to be rewritten for a new generation. It needs to be presented honestly, examined critically and supported by evidence.

The ultimate question is therefore a difficult but simple one:

Has Jamaat-e-Islami genuinely reassessed its political legacy of 1971, or has it merely changed the language with which it talks about that legacy?

The answer will not be found in political statements alone. It will be found in the party’s documents, positions and actions.

Because 1971 cannot simply be rewritten.

History can be debated. New research can challenge old interpretations. New evidence can deepen our understanding of the past.

But a documented past cannot be erased for political convenience.

The history of Bangladesh’s independence ultimately belongs not to any political party, but to the people of Bangladesh. And genuine political transformation begins with the willingness to confront that history rather than run away from it.